In 1976 Diffie and Hellman [DH76] revolutionized the field of cryptography by introducing the concept of publickey cryptography. Their key exchange protocol is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm (DL) problem over a finite field. Years later, [Kob87, Mil86] introduced a variant of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, based on the difficulty of the DL problem in the group of points of an elliptic curve (EC) over a finite field. Since their introduction, elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) have been extensively studied not only by the research community but also in industry.
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In particular, there are several standards involving EC, such as the IEEE P1363 [P1399] standardization effort and the bank industry standards [ANS99]. It is important to point out that ECC benefit from shorter operand sizes when compared to RSA or DL based systems. This fact makes ECC particularly well suited for small processors and memory constrained environments.
In 1989 Koblitz suggested for the first time the generalization of EC to curves of higher genus, namely hyperelliptic curves (HEC) [Kob88] . In contrast to the ECC case, it has only been until recently that Koblitz's idea to use HEC for cryptographic applications, has been analyzed and implemented both in software [SS00, Eng99, SSI98, SS98, Kri97] and in more hardware-oriented platforms such as FPGAs [Wol01, BCLW02] . In 1999, [Sma99] concluded that there seems to be little practical benefit in using HEC, because of the difficulty of finding hyperelliptic curves and their relatively poor performance when compared to EC. However, recently the HEC group operation has been improved [MDM + 02, Tak02, Har00, Lan02].
It is well known from the work in [Gau00] that the best algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm in the group of divisors of the Jacobian of a HEC is Pollard's rho method or one of its parallel variants [Pol78, vOW99] . For curves of genus higher than 4, [Gau00] showed that there exists an algorithm with complexity q 2 where F q is the field over which the HEC is defined. Thus, in this work, we only consider HEC of genus less than four, as curves of higher genus are potentially insecure from the cryptographic point of view.
It is widely accepted that for cryptographic applications based on EC or HEC one needs a group order of size at least ≈ 2 160 . Thus, for HECC over F q we will need g · log 2 q ≈ 2 160 , where g is the genus of the curve. In particular, for a curve of genus two, we will need a field F q with |F q | ≈ 2 80 , i.e., 80-bit long operands. Similarly, for curves of genus three, our discussion above implies 54-bit long operands. These field sizes make HEC specially promising for use in embedded environments where memory and speed are constrained, and where the above operand sizes seem well suited to their small processor architectures.
Our Contributions In the past years, the research community has worked hard to optimize the group operations of genus-2 curves [Har00, Nag00, Lan01]. For genus-3 hyperelliptic curves, [KGM + 02] is the first attempt to obtain explicit 1 formulas for the group operation of HEC defined over odd characteristic fields. This work presents for the first time a generalized explicit formula for genus-3 curves including fields of characteristic 2. We optimized the formulae presented in [KGM + 02] and we decreased the number of operations required to add and double two divisors. In particular, for certain curves our group doubling formula requires less than 50% of the field multiplications used by [KGM + 02]. This improvement implies that one can implement HECC using our formulae twice as fast as when using [KGM + 02] techniques.
Previous to our contribution, comparing HECC and ECC was a difficult task, because the operations involved in both systems were very different. Furthermore, the group operation of an ECC has a deterministic number of field operations regardless of the coordinate represen-tation. On the other hand, the complexity of HECC implementations based on the computation of polynomial greatest common divisors (gcd) is not deterministic 2 . With the introduction of explicit formulae for the computation of the group operation in a HECC as done here and in [Har00, Nag00, Lan01, KGM
+ 02], the comparison is more exact as shown by a 10% difference between our theoretical and practical results. The aim of the comparison is to be able to estimate the performance of ECC versus HECC depending on the word sizes and the properties of the implemented field libraries. The most interesting results are that (1) in some special cases HECC can be faster than ECC of the same level of security and that (2) genus-3 curves are faster than genus-2 curves.
We support our theoretical findings with an HECC implementation on an embedded ARM processor. Our implementation uses the best explicit formulae for genus-2 and genus-3 curves. The timings are compared to the best known ECC implementations and we conclude that for our implementation genus-2 curves are about a factor of 2 slower than ECC, while genus-3 curves are approximately a factor of 1.5 slower. 
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